Syria: fall of Assad a blow for Iran’s ‘Shia crescent’ – here are its foreign policy options in the new-look Middle East

When Hafez al-Assad, an Alawite minority member, seized control of the Ba'ath Party in Syria in 1970, he faced a significant backlash. The Syrian Constitution stipulated that only Muslims could hold the presidency, and the Alawites were deemed non-Muslim by many Sunni groups.

In this critical moment, the Iranian mullahs salvaged Assad’s presidency by declaring the Alawites a branch of Shia Islam. This marked the beginning of a partnership that would shape the Middle East for the next five decades.

Syria under the Assads was the first Arab state to recognise the Islamic Republic of Iran. They supported the nascent regime against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq during the war with Iraq between 1980 and 1988.

In 2011, Bashar al-Assad – fearing for his regime’s survival – invited Iranian military, logistical and political support into Syria. Iran seized the opportunity to transform Syria into a pivotal state within the so-called “Shia crescent”: a cross-border region predominantly inhabited by Shia populations and Iran-backed groups, stretching from Iran-backed militias in Iraq to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Dubbed the “axis of resistance” by Iran, this geopolitical formation has been instrumental in maintaining Assad’s power, supporting Hezbollah and Hamas against Israel and consolidating the influence of the Quds forces. The Quds is the military unit tasked with “operations external to Iran to advance the Islamic revolution,” as one analyst put it.

But the Shia crescent has now collapsed. Iran, confronting a new reality in Syria, now faces several options, each with significant regional and global implications.

Early reports indicate that Tehran has adopted a conciliatory approach towards the victorious rebel forces in Syria. But the future of this relationship partly hinges on whether the new Syrian government permits Iranian logistical support to Hezbollah via Syria and invites the Quds forces back to continue their operations against Israel.

Should Tehran perceive this as unlikely, it might resort to destabilising Syria, as it did in Lebanon in the 1980s and Iraq following Saddam’s fall.

Another possibility is that Iran, believing the Axis of Resistance is lost, might leverage its uranium enrichment capabilities. Iran has already accelerated its uranium enrichment efforts, provoking outcry from the UN and European nations, including the UK.

Facing a second Trump presidency, the Iranian regime might view developing nuclear weapons as the sole deterrent against western and Israeli aggression. It is estimated that Iran has invested US$30 billion to US$50 billion (£24 billion to £40 billion) over the past 13 years in Syria. This sort of funding can now instead be made available for uranium enrichment.

Both scenarios could escalate regional uncertainty beyond the impacts of the past 13 years. Potential conflicts in Syria among rebel groups and a nuclear confrontation between Iran and Israel, which maintains a policy of ambiguity, could further destabilise regional and global geopolitics.

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To the full article by Professor Ali Bilgic visit the Conversation.